The Fascist Legacy of Europe

This post from Pathetic Earthlings about possible effects of Facism on the stance against terrorism of various countries (France, Germany, Spain, and Iraq) made me want to say "Blogga, please!" At first blush, the idea that their previous authoritarian governments is affecting current European foreign policy seems rational.

But George's arguments leave rationality back in 1945. I would argue that the primary reason that the governments of both France and Germany wish to regain their former status of world powers. One of the easiest ways to differentiate their foreign policy is to take a different position than the United States.

But I believe George was claiming that the populations of France, Germany, and Spain (I am going to ignore Iraq, for purposes of simplicity) have somehow been stunted by their fascist history:

How can a civilized people let themselves slip into Fascism? And how can any people so recently freed from under the Fascist boot not recognize it on their own doorstep? Or do they recognize it all too well, and let intimacy provide the fatal pause?

While the above quote might make sense if France, Germany, and Spain were all one country (FrancEspana-Deutschland, perhaps?) with a shared history. Last time I checked, France never "slipped" into Fascism; it was conquered by Nazi Germany. And despite gw's comments on the supposed low numbers of the Free French (Do you think it was simple to escape to London?), there was an active Resistance movement in France, especially after the Normandy invasion. And while recent events might possibly classify as fascism at Europe's "doorstep," it is a huge stretch. The abject absurdity of Iraq being a danger to Europe (especially since George suggests that at least France was collaborating with Hussein) is so obvious, I refuse to talk about it further.

Virtually the only point I agree with is that populations that do not have the same liberal democratic traditions of government as American tend to be more forgiving of authoritarian governments (although I would use Russia and China as my examples, rather than Europe). But this is by no means a blanket fact. I would like to see how George would explain the significant part of the British population that did not support the war, considering their abject lack of past fascist governments.

Excepting Spain, France and Germany stopped being a part of the Third Reich a long time ago. Long enough so that significant amounts of their population do not actually remember Nazism. This makes George's idea of a "national Stockholm Syndrome" even more suspect.

Comments

At 12:00 on April 7, 2004, gw wrote:

Thanks for your comments. Just a couple brief responses:

Part of the mythology of modern France is that the French valiantly resisted the Nazi onslaught, and kept on resisting while their nation was held hostage. The reality (as I increasingly learn) is sadly much more complicated. For one thing, the Nazis hardly "conquered" France, they just drove there, and the French let them. The French by and large collaborated with the Nazis in practically every aspect of the war, from sabotaging Allied operations in Indochina to rounding up Jews for the death camps. If they were resisting, they did a mighty fine job of pretending. (Trivia question: how many French troops took part in the D-Day invasion?) Only after the war was it deemed necessary to rebuild the myth of the "French resistance," listening in secret to De Gaulle's broadcast's from London and plotting to take back their country. (PS: this is not my area of expertise.)

Obviously, European foreign policy today doesn't mirror what it was during WWII. None of us are permanently stuck with the sins of the past in some global Greek tragedy. But I have to wonder: Saddam's Iraq was the clearest possible example of Fascism cut straight from 1930s cloth. And yet, even though Iraq is helluva lot closer to Paris and Berlin than it is to Washington, the Europeans just couldn't see it. They still can't see it.

At 8:37 on April 7, 2004, Martey wrote:

gw,

I partially agree with you; many French did collaborate with the Nazis. But their reasons for doing so were relatively pragmatic.

As you probably already know, France was completely devasted as a result of the First World War. In addition to large number of casualties among both soldiers and civilians, a significant part of the northern countryside was destroyed. Were it not for the aid of Britain and the United States, France certainly would have lost. To compound French difficulties, the German birthrate was higher than the French birthrate, a condition that was predicted to eventually lead to disparity in military strength. As a result, French government policy between the wars was dedicated to preventing another attack from Germany, most visibly seen in the construction of the Maginot Line.

So why did the Wehrmacht roll over the French forces so easily? The answer is not in French complicity (for both the Netherlands and Belgium was invaded in the same campaign), but in Germany's investment in modern military technology like tanks and airplanes. Please recall that the Nazi military success was duplicated throughout Europe, and that the only two major military powers not to fall under Nazi domination had extenuating circumstances. Britain was separated from the Continent by the Channel, and Russia had large resources of manpower and the benefit of having a ridiculously large nation, which extended Nazi supply lines and complicating Nazi policy by introducing large amounts of Slavs into their territory.

While there were many French "collabos," this Wikipedia article contains some interesting information:

100,000 Free French soldiers fought in the Allied side in Italy in 1943. By the time of the Normandy Invasion, the Free French forces numbered more than 400,000 people. The Free French 2nd Armoured Division, under General Philippe Leclerc, landed at Normandy and eventually led the drive towards Paris. The Free French 1st Army, under General Jean de Lattre de Tassigny, joined the Allies' invasion of southern France and took Alsace.
This page has even more detailed information, including how the French forces increased as the war progressed.

Finally, for all practical intents and purposes, the distance from Baghdad to the European capitals is the same as the distance to Washington. While Hussein's military definitely was a regional threat, there was certainly no threat of Republican Guard columns appearing on the White House lawn. Even if you allow for the possibility of Iraqis somehow (deus ex machina? the North Koreans?) developing nuclear weapons and an intercontinental delivery system, Paris and Berlin would not be on the list of targeted cities. The Europeans did not see Hussein as a threat because he wasn't a threat to Europe.

At 1:04 on April 7, 2004, gw wrote:

Martey:

I really should be getting to work, but I did want to respond. I should be careful not to over-indict France. Obviously there were resisters, and obviously many French did fight for their country (my question about D-Day was not facetious). But the French also fought WITH the Nazis -- that is, in cooperation with Axis military goals, in France and around the world. I'm too lazy to look up the references at the moment. And was it "pragmatism" that drove the Vichy government to send hundreds of thousands of Jews to their deaths?

While your strategic observations are correct, I would just point to the example of Belgium in the first World War. The details escape me at the moment but in a nutshell, Hindenburg gave the King of Belgium (then a nonbelligerent) a choice: let my armies pass through Belgium and around the French line, or we'll blast our way through. In what John Keegan calls the only noble act of 1914, the King looked at his strategic situation, saw that he couldn't stand a chance against the Kaiser's armies -- but still said no. At the time, Europe still hadn't really seen what modern artillery could do against medieval fixed defenses. Belgium was the first to find out.

My point is that despite this kind of complicity and (at best) amorality, after the war France was for geopolitical reasons largely given a pass. Thus it's never had to face its own history like the Germans and Japanese have had to do (with varying results).

Regarding Iraq, I'd just note that France at least believes the Arab world to be within its sphere of influence. If anyone should be upset by the pathological backwardness exhibited by the Arab tyrannies (and perfected by Saddam), it should have been France. Obviously not; it suits them just fine.

At 4:19 on April 8, 2004, Martey wrote:

gw,

It would be impossible for me to lie and say that the majority of the French population did not (whether through explicit or implicit means) collaborate with the Nazis' during the four years of occupation during World War II. But it should be somewhat obvious why France did not go through the same "de-Fascism" and post-war occupation of Germany and Japan; while the militarism of both Germany and Japan caused the war, the collaboration of France was a valid (if both misguided and morally wrong) response to the occupation.

To an extent, I think the "total Resistance myth" helps to show how France has expelled its collaboratorist elements from its culture. While de Gaulle (and the Free French in general) were treated as heroes after the war, Petain and the collaborators were seen as traitors.

Finally, in terms of global threats, I would argue that North Korea is much more of a threat to the United States than Iraq. Either way, both of those countries are far more of a threat to the United States than they are to Europe.

Earlier: News from "The" New York Times Later: A Religion of Peace